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BOOK REVIEW
Law Without Order. MARVIN E. FRANKEL. New York: Hill & Wang.
1973. Pp. x, 124. $5.95.
Deeply moved by his experience in a federal district court, Judge
Frankel presents a compelling criticism of the unreviewable sentenc-
ing power now lodged in a singlejudge.'This largely uncharted power
exercised by one person finds no counterpart in the administration of
justice, yet the resulting sentences have far greater consequences to
the individual sentenced, to others indirectly affected, and to the
community, than much less important judicial decisions reviewable
under legal principles or upon an open record. Statutes may confine
the sentencer within a permissible range of imprisonment or fines,
but no legal principles guide the choice within the range. Moreover,
the discretion thus exercised is untrained, for the judge's
qualifications do not embrace the sentencing function. Any assump-
tion to the contrary is shattered by the inequalities in sentences
imposed by judges of comparable legal accomplishments.
Thejudge does have the light afforded by the trial over which he
has presided and usually a presentence report is prepared for him by
probation or like officials. These reports, designed to include a vari-
ety of information about the defendant, are indispensable. But here
too a grave defect afflicts the system; the reports often contain de-
rogatory information of which neither the defendant nor his counsel
is advised. This practice of nondisclosure is defended by some as
necessary to protect confidential sources. As Judge Frankel says,
there is "the intolerable risk of error when we rely for grave decisions
of law upon untested hearsay and rumor."' He reaches a sound
position as follows: "[D]isclosure ought to be the pre-
ferred and presumed rule, subject only to exceptions for rare and
unique cases where thejudge perceives specific dangers or injuries to
be avoided."2
The actual sentencing, after the defendant and his counsel have
been accorded the right to address the court, is usually a swift an-
nouncement unexplained by any legal guides and well-nigh unre-
P. 32.
P. 31. 1 took the position in an opinion for our court that, "in a matter ofsuch importance,
whether information which the informer is unwilling to have disclosed to the person principally
affected should be used in the sentencing process," raises a question. United States v. Bryant,
442 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971).
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viewable as to its fitness.3 Judge Frankel reasonably characterizes this
situation as one "of fundamental lawlessness. 4 The basic problem is
the absence of rational ordering-"the unbridled power of the sen-
tencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory." 5 There follow the no less
silent walls of confinement. Even the parole authorities who may then
consider the sentence are relieved of the necessity of giving reasons
for acting or not acting, and they almost never do give reasons.
Nevertheless, Judge Frankel would not remove the sentencing
responsibility from the legal profession. The contribution of other
disciplines should be made within the wide range of relationships
which are the heritage of the law.6 It is the law which should fashion
controls for the exercise of the tremendous sentencing power. Some
ameliorating techniques are presently available. These include the
Sentencing Institutes.7 Of potentially greater value, but little used,
are voluntary Sentencing Councils of Judges, which enable the judge
in each case to have the help of two colleagues. The author gives these
councils high praise, yet they are used in only three places-the
Southern Districts of Michigan and New York and the Northern
District of Illinois. The rock bottom need, however, is for appellate
court review of sentences, the lack of which is well-nigh incredible in a
system of law. "[I]n no other area of our law does one man exercise
such unrestricted power [as the trial judge's unreviewable sentencing
power]. No other country in the free world permits this condition to
exist."8 Sentences, like the exercise of discretion elsewhere, should be
I Contrast the special provisions applicable to federal youth offenders under 18 U.S.C. §§
5001-37 (1970), the subject of several recent opinions of my court. See United States v. Reed &
Hoston, 476 F.2d 1145 (en banc) (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Coefield, 476 F.2d 1152 (en
banc) (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Ward, 454 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Waters, 437 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
4 P. 49.
5 Id.
' Proceeding in this direction, the author interpolates that our sentences are the most
severe of any industrialized nation and that too many are in prison who ought to be on
probation, on work release, in halfway houses, fined, or handled under other possible alterna-
tives to be imaginatively explored.
7 These Institutes are authorized by statute to aid the judge in "studying, discussing, and
formulating objectives, policies, standards, and criteria for sentencing those convicted of crimes
and offenses in courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1970).
s The quotation is from the report of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards for CriminalJ ustice, approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 1968. ABA SPECIAL
COMM. ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 77 (1968).
Judge Frankel's study also affords strong support for the recent bill introduced by several
Senators, including Senators Hruska, McClellan, and Burdick, which would go part way in
granting the courts of appealsjurisdiction to review unreasonable sentences imposed by district
court judges. It has been described as similar to but broader in scope than the proposal of the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Law.
[Vol. 59:177
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reviewable to determine the proper application of relevant factors
prescribed by law and for abuse of discretion.Judge Frankel does not
ignore the problems this added duty would create for appellate
courts. He is at pains to consider them, but concludes: "[A]bandoning
all the permutations the future may bring, I stump here for appellate
review of sentences as one step toward the rule of law in a quarter
where lawless and unchecked power has reigned for too long."9
A separate chapter is devoted to the widely-used indeterminate
sentences, carrying the possibility of mitigating disparities in prison
terms through the action of parole boards which share responsibility
with the sentencing judge. Judge Frankel would not eliminate these
sentences, which are hopefully designed to fit the individual, but he
persuasively advances the postition that their general use cannot be
justified. Advantages areoverbalanced by the inequalities and injus-
tices which result, gravely impeding the rehabilitating expectations of
the system-expectations largely unfulfilled. There also inheres in
these sentences a basic flaw; those who supervise the sentences after
their imposition are without legal guides. The presumption in any
event should favor definiteness, with indefiniteness required to be
justified in particular cases. The latter might well include, for exam-
ple, some sex and drug offenses, those of youth offenders and also,
crimes of the "dangerous-offender" whose disorder is the generating
factor of his danger. A rehabilitative quality inheres in definiteness if
the sentencing is unaccompanied by an explained purpose which is
related to the character of the sentence. The fact is that as presently
administered the indeterminate sentence simply reflects the differ-
ences injudges rather than differences in the needs of the individuals
sentenced in that manner.
Judge Frankel envisages a future in which law itself develops the
objective that a particular sentence is chosen to serve, that is, whether
it is imposed as retribution, deterrence, denunciation, incapacitation,
or rehabilitation. This is a matter in which the law should guide the
sentencer. Moreover, the sentencing judge should be required to
state at the time the sentence is imposed "which among the allowable
purposes were the supporting bases for each particular sentence," 1°
with the inherent rehabilitative quality which resides in the knowl-
edge thus conveyed.
I have long been convinced of the need for review of sentences, although not so thoroughly
convinced itshould be by the courts of appeals rather than by some other body composed for the
purpose. I do believe, however, the first most feasible step toward review to be by the courts of
appeals.
9 P. 85.
10 p. 108.
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While the need for immediate remedies, such as appellate court
review, is urgent, Judge Frankel's impressive treatment of the subject
leads him inevitably to the projection of means of accomplishing
change. The required research for improving the manner in which
we deprive persons of liberty and thus seek to protect and promote
the common good calls for the creation of a sentencing commission
perhaps composed of judges, lawyers, penologists, psychologists,
criminologists, business people, artists, and former prisoners. I would
add the ministry. Among the tasks of the commission would be to seek
agreement on factors to be considered in sentencing and a procedure
for weighing these factors. The imposition of the sentence would be
accompanied by an explanatory profile of the elements which entered
into it. Rule-making authority, as well as the responsibility for re-
search and study, similar to that reposed in other agencies of
government, should be delegated to the commission. Action taken
would be subject to judicial confinement to the authority delegated.
The commission's powers would also be subject to legislative delinea-
tion of the basic principles and purposes of sanctions, the permissible
range for particular offenses, methods of treatment, and kinds of
facilities.
The author's deeply felt and persuasive plea for progress along
the above lines reflects the basic ambition of his impressive study; we
must no longer acquiesce in the "monstrous evils perpetrated daily
for all of us .... The need for change is clear."' I Although eschewing
constitutional controversy, there is the hint of serious questions which
cast a shadow of illegality upon the operations of the present system.
Judge Frankel seeks constructive development in the common good.
His appeal is compelling. His voice should also be our own, the more
so because he speaks for the voiceless as well as for us all.
Charles Fahy*
P. 124.
* Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
